Introduction
In this paper, we describe an optimised variant of Wikström's mixnet which shuffles vectors of ElGamal ciphertexts in parallel. We then show in detail that this construction is secure.
A verifiable shuffle takes a packet of ciphertexts, which it re-encrypts and shuffles to produce an output packet. More specifically, a cryptographic shuffle of ElGamal encryptions e = (e 1 , ...., e N ) is another list of ElGamal encryptions e ′ = (e ′ 1 , ..., e ′ N ), which contains the same plaintexts m i in permuted order. Given e and e ′ we may wish to prove that they have this relationship, this called a proof of shuffle.
Wikström's verifiable mixnet as we refer to it here was first presented in "Proofs of Restricted Shuffles" by Terelius and Wikström [2] , building on Wikström's previous work in [3] . Specifically we take the optimised variant for ElGamal which appears to be in common use; for instance, it is presented in Haenni et al's pseudo-code algorithms for implementing Wikström's verifiable mixnet [1] . We extend the mixnet to support parallel shuffles, where each e i and e ′ i are themselves vectors of related ciphertexts. (The possibility of doing this is proven by the Wikström's result but we wish to show that this particular instance with its optimisations is secure.) 2 Notation -G q is a cyclic group of prime order q in which both the decisional and computational Diffie-Hellman problems are hard. We will use the multiplicative notation for the group operation. As usually, by Z q we denote the field of integers modulo q. -A N is the set of vectors of length N containing elements of A. We will denote vectors in bold, for instance a. We will denote the ith element using subscript; for instance as a i . -Similarly, A N×N is the set of square matrices of order N containing elements of A. We will denote matrices using upper case letters, for instance M. We will denote the ith column of M as M i and the element ith row and jth column as M i, j . A matrix M, containing only 0 and 1 values, is a permutation matrix, if every column and every row contains exactly one 1.
-PC h,h 1 (m, r), for m, r ∈ Z q and h, h 1 ∈ G q , is defined as h r h m 1 (note that h and h 1 are group elements and hence the multiplication here denotes the group multiplication). PC h,h 1 (m, r) is known as a Pedersen commitment.
-EPC h,h 1 ,...,h N (m, r), for m ∈ Z N q and r ∈ Z q , is defined as h r ∏ N i=1 h m i i (otherwise known as an extended Pedersen commitment).
j , which means that c i is the extended Pedersen commitment to the ith column of M.
-Enc g,pk (m, r) for m ∈ G q and r ∈ Z q is (g r , pk r m) (the ElGamal encryption of the group element m) -ReEnc g,pk (e, r), for e ∈ G 2 q and r ∈ Z q is (e 1 g r , e 2 pk r ).
-Enc g,pk (m, r), for m ∈ G w q and r ∈ Z w q , is Enc g,pk (m 1 , r 1 ), . . . , Enc g,pk (m w , r w ) -ReEnc g,pk (e, r), for e ∈ (G 2 q ) w and r ∈ Z w q , is ReEnc g,pk (e 1 , r 1 ), . . . , ReEnc g,pk (e w , r w ) -ax, for a ∈ Z q and x ∈ Z N q , is a vector of length N where ith position is equal to ax i . -x a , for a ∈ Z q and x ∈ Z N q , is a vector of length N where ith position is equal to x a i . -For two vectors x, y ∈ Z N q we some sometimes abuse notation by writing x + y, x * y, and x y to denote the pairwise addition, multiplication, and exponentiation of the vectors respectively.
-For a matrix M, by π M we denote the permutation of the set {1, . . . , N} defined by M, that is such a permutation that for each vector x we have x = (y π(1) , . . . , y π(N) ), where y = Mx. -A binary relation R for a set statements of S and witnesses W is a subset of the cartesian product of S and W . -For two binary relations R and R ′ , we denote by R ∧ R ′ a relation between (S * S ′ ) and (W * W ′ ) the cartesian product of the statements and witness of R and R ′ . The relation is said to hold when both the subrelations hold. -For two binary relations R and R ′ , we denote by R ∨ R ′ a relation between (S * S ′ ) and (W * W ′ ). The relation is said to hold when either subrelations holds. -For two binary relations R and R ′ where W = W ′ , we denote by R∧R ′ a relation between (S * S ′ ) and (W ). The relation is said to hold when both the subrelations hold. We will abuse notation by writing R∧R ′ when W = W ′ but are both cartesian products with subgroups in common. Common Input :A group generator g ∈ G q , public key pk ∈ G q , matrix commitment c ∈ G N q , commitment parameters h, h 1 , ..., h N ∈ G q , ciphertext vectors e 1 , ..., e N ∈ (G 2 q ) w and
1 V chooses u ∈ Z N q randomly and hands u to P. 2 P computes u ′ = Mu. Then P choosesr ∈ Z N q at random and computes
, and ω ω ω 4 4 4 ∈ Z w q , and hands the following values to V:ĉ
3 V chooses a challenge c ∈ Z q at random and sends it to P. 4 P then responds,
V accepts if and only if
Formal Security Statement In the security statement for the presented shuffle algorithm, we will use the following notation.
is a relationship between the commitment parameters (h, h 1 , ..., h N ) and (m, m ′ ∈ Z N q r, r ′ ∈ Z q ) which holds if and only if EPC(m, r) = EPC(m ′ , r ′ ) and m = m ′ .
, and r ∈ Z N q which holds if
, where π M is a permutation of the set {1, . . . N}, is the relation which holds if an only if
Proposition 1. Algorithm 2 is a perfectly complete, sound, and statistical honest verifier zero-knowledge 4-message proof of the relationship
).
Since it is infeasible under the discrete logarithm assumption to find a pair satisfying R com . Thus, the proposition computationally implies a proof of knowledge of
, unless we find a discrete log. To prove the proposition, one needs to show the correctness, the zero-knowledge, and the soundness properties. For completeness of the presentation, we demonstrate those properties in the following subsections.
Zero-knowledge The honest-verifier zero-knowledge simulator choosesĉ 1 , ...,ĉ N ∈ G q , s, s ′ , u ∈ Z N q , s 4 ∈ Z w q , and s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , c ∈ Z q randomly and defines t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3 , t 4, j ,t i by the equations in step five.
We can observer that the statistical distance between a real and a simulated transcript is negligible in q:
-u are distributed uniformly in Z N q in both. -ĉ 1 , ...,ĉ N are distributed uniformly in both transcripts. In the simulated one, it is easily seen by construction. In the real transcriptĉ i = gˆr iĉ u ′ i i−1 , wherer i ∈ R Z q , which randomly distributes them in G q as well.
-The challenge c is uniformly distributed in both -In both transcripts, S = s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ,ŝ, s ′ are distributed uniformly in their domains by their definitions (in the simulated transcript it is readily visible; in the real transcript, it is because ω's are distributed uniformly). -In both transcripts, the above values determine the values of t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3 , t 4 ,t by the equations of Step 5.
Correctness We will now show the above protocol is correct, which means that in an honest run, the verifier accepts the proof. We first show the shape of honestĉ i .
by definition ofĉ 1 andĉ 0
by algebraic manipulation
by algebraic manipulation Now we will continue by induction:
by algebraic manipulation Now on to the main thing. Note that in the following, we use the fact that c i is a commitment to a permutation matrix M (and we will use the definition of a permutation matrix).
by algebraic manipulation and definition of u
by definition r
By definition of s 3 and s
By definition of e ′ and u
By algebraic manipulation
By definition of r 
By algebraic manipulation
Soundness We follow the structure of the original proof, as presented in [2] , and present the extractor in two parts. First, we show that, for two different transcripts with the same u but different c, we can extract witness for certain sub-statements. In the extended extractor we show that, given witnesses for these sub-statements which hold for n different u, we can extract witness to the main statements.
Basic extractor. Given two accepting transcripts
with c = c * , the basic extractor computes
Note that we reuse symbols from the Algorithm 1. While they denote analogous entities, they are not necessarily identical (if the transcripts have not been obtained in the honest way). We will prove that
The proof consists of simple algebraic transformations:
By the verification definition
By verification definition
By definition of EPC
By definition of r By algebraic manipulations
Extractor We now sketch the extended extractor which, for a given statement (see the common input in Algorithm 1), for n different witnesses extracted by the basic extractor, produces the witnesses to the main statement. Let the collective output of the basic extractors be denoted asr,
extracted from the primary challenges U ∈ Z N×N q . We denote by U i the ith column of U which is the challenge vector from the ith run of the basic extractor, and by U j,i the j element of the challenge vector from the ith run of the basic extractor.
First note with overwhelming probability the set of U i s is linearly independent, concretely the probability is bounded by q−2 q . From linear independence, it follows that their exists A ∈ Z N×N q such that UA l is the lth standard unit vector in Z q which we will denote by I l . A is the inverse of U . Clearly,
by some algebraic manipulation and
by algebraic manipulation Therefore, we can open c to the matrix M, where the lth column of M is U ′ A l , with randomness r, A l . In other words we open c = U ′ A using randomnessrA. We expect M to be a permutation matrix, but if it is not, then one can find a witness to R com (which, as has been mentioned, can only happen with negligible probability, under our security assumptions). We extract in two different ways depending on whether M1 = 1.
Option one If M1 = 1, then let u ′′ = M1 and note that
in which case we found a witness breaking the commitment scheme.
Option two If M1 = 1, then recall Theorem 1 from "Proofs of Restricted Shuffles", which states that M is a permutation matrix if and only if M1 = 1 and ∏
The Schwartz-Zippel says that if you sample, a non-zero polynomial, at a random point the chance that it equals zero is negligible in the order of the underlying field; hence, with overwhelming probability there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,
Since this is true with overwhelming probability, we require it to be true and rewind if this is not the case. (Strictly speaking we should take N + 1 extractions from the basic extractor, if we recover a different M we win, if we get the same M then U l+1 is actually independent of M and the lemma can be applied.)
Let u ′′ = MU j and note that
Which must be true since
U j follows from the base statements and ∏
This completes the proof that M is a permutation matrix or we have found a witness to R com .
The correctness of U ′ We now show that U ′ l = MU l for all l ∈ [1, N] or we can find a witnesses to R com . Let u ′′ = MU l and by assumption u ′′ = U ′ l .
EPC(U
Extracting the randomness We having shown that if M is not a permutation matrix we can extract a witness to R com . We now show that we can extract R ∈ Z w×N q such that e ′ i = ReEnc pk (e π(i) , R π(i) ). 
We have now shown that ReEnc pk (e l , R * l , A l ) = e ′ π −1 (l)
; hence, R l = R * l , A l which concludes the proof.
